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The Issue
Consider a wealthy couple from South Dakota on a shopping spree in New York 
City. They buy $1 million of art in a well-known gallery, which packs and ships 
it back to South Dakota. Does the gallery have to collect the South Dakota sales 
tax on this transaction?
As is well known to the readers of this Journal, South Dakota in preparation 
for its attack on Quill passed S. 106, “to provide for the collection of sales taxes 
from certain remote sellers … and to declare an emergency.”1 It requires out-of-
state sellers to collect and remit sales tax “as if the seller had a physical presence 
in the State.”2 “Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, any seller selling 
tangible personal property, products transferred electronically, or services for 
delivery into South Dakota, who does not have a physical presence in the state … 
shall remit the sales tax … .”3 The Act covers only sellers that, on an annual basis, 
deliver more than $100,000 of goods or services into the State or engage in 200 
or more separate transactions for the delivery of goods or services into the State.4
By drafting its statute in terms of collecting the sales tax, South Dakota is 
at odds with Bellas Hess, which involved the collection of the Illinois use tax.5 
Similarly, it is at odds with Quill, which also involved the collection of the use 
tax.6 Was this a strategic error?
The 1944 Companion Cases: Dilworth and General 
Trading
Under the statute, the gallery’s collection obligation extends only to the South 
Dakota sales tax. It has no obligation to collect the South Dakota use tax. 
Constitutionally, does a South Dakota sale exist in the fact pattern above?
Did South Dakota Make a Strategic 
Error in Drafting Its Wayfair Statute?
By Richard D. Pomp*
Richard D. Pomp questions whether South Dakota made a 
strategic error in drafting its Wayfair statute.
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DID SOUTH DAKOTA MAKE A STRATEGIC ERROR IN DRAFTING ITS WAYFAIR STATUTE?
The start of an answer goes back to 1944 when the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided a pair of cases: McLeod v. J.E. 
Dilworth7 and General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n.8 
Dilworth involved the constitutionality of the imposi-
tion of the Arkansas sales tax. General Trading involved 
the constitutionality of the collection of the Iowa use tax. 
Arkansas lost Dilworth; Iowa won General Trading. Justice 
Frankfurter decided both opinions.
The taxpayers in Dilworth were:
Tennessee corporations with home offices and places 
of business in Memphis where they sell machinery 
and mill supplies. They are not qualified to do busi-
ness in Arkansas and have neither sales office, branch 
plant nor any other place of business in that State. 
Orders for goods come to Tennessee through solici-
tation in Arkansas by traveling salesmen domiciled 
in Tennessee, by mail or telephone. But no matter 
how an order is placed it requires acceptance by 
the Memphis office, and on approval the goods are 
shipped from Tennessee. Title passes upon delivery 
to the carrier in Memphis, and collection of the sales 
price is not made in Arkansas. In short, we are here 
concerned with sales made by Tennessee vendors that 
are consummated in Tennessee for the delivery of 
goods in Arkansas.9
We would have to destroy both business and legal 
notions to deny that under these circumstances 
the sale—the transfer of ownership—was made 
in Tennessee. For Arkansas to impose a tax on 
such transaction would be to project its powers 
beyond its boundaries and to tax an interstate 
transaction.10
The gallery would argue that like Dilworth, it was not 
qualified to do business in South Dakota and had no sales 
office, branch plant, or any other place of business there. 
It did no solicitation in South Dakota.11 Title passed to 
the art in New York, where the sale was consummated for 
the delivery of goods in South Dakota.
There is, however, another aspect to Dilworth. The whole 
transaction, starting with solicitation in Arkansas and end-
ing with the consumer having possession of the goods in 
Arkansas, constituted interstate commerce, which, under 
the jurisprudence of that day, could not be taxed.12 That 
part of the opinion was clearly overturned by subsequent 
cases.13 But still left open is the constitutional characteriza-
tion of where a sale takes place.
The contours on what constitutes a sale might have 
been expected to have been refined in subsequent litiga-
tion. The companion case of General Trading made that 
unnecessary. General Trading involved nearly identical 
facts to Dilworth. The constitutional issue, however, 
was whether the market state (Iowa) could make the 
out-of-state vendor collect its use tax. Iowa was not 
attempting to make the remote vendor collect its sales 
tax and was not attempting to impose its sales tax on 
that vendor.14 Nor was Iowa imposing its use tax on 
the vendor.
Frankfurter, writing again for the majority, upheld the 
obligation to collect the use tax, and amazingly did not cite 
the companion case of Dilworth, which he also authored. 
Dilworth, by contrast, did allude to General Trading, albeit 
not by name:
It is suggested, however, that Arkansas could have 
levied a tax of the same amount on the use of these 
goods in Arkansas by the Arkansas buyers, and that 
such a use tax would not exceed the limits upon state 
power derived from the United States Constitution. 
Whatever might be the fate of such a tax were it before 
us,15 the not too short answer is that Arkansas has 
chosen not to impose such a use tax, as its Supreme 
Court so emphatically found. A sales tax and a use tax 
in many instances may bring about the same result. 
But they are different in conception, are assessments 
upon different transactions, and in the interlacings of 
the two legislative authorities within our federation 
may have to justify themselves on different constitu-
tional grounds. A sales tax is a tax on the freedom of 
purchase—a freedom which wartime restrictions serve 
to emphasize. A use tax is a tax on the enjoyment of 
that which was purchased. In view of the differences 
in the basis of these two taxes and the differences in 
the relation of the taxing state to them, a tax on an 
interstate sale like the one before us and unlike the 
tax on the enjoyment of the goods sold, involves an 
assumption of power by a State which the Commerce 
Clause was meant to end. The very purpose of the 
By drafting its statute in terms of 
collecting the sales tax, South Dakota 
is at odds with Bellas Hess, which 
involved the collection of the Illinois 
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Commerce Clause was to create an area of free trade 
among the several States. That clause vested the power 
of taxing a transaction forming an unbroken process 
of interstate commerce in the Congress, not in the 
States.16
Although paying a sales tax and collecting a use tax may 
appear to be a formal distinction, Frankfurter obviously 
disagreed.17
It may help to understand Dilworth by thinking about 
sales as being arrayed on a continuum. At one end are 
the sales made by a South Dakota gallery to a customer 
who leaves with the purchased art. That this constitutes 
a South Dakota sale is beyond constitutional reproach. 
At the other end of the continuum is our South Dakota 
tourist buying art at a New York gallery that ships it to 
South Dakota. Dilworth places this situation at the other 
end of the continuum and treats it as a New York sale.18 
Under Dilworth, no South Dakota sale exists so how can 
the New York gallery owner be asked to collect the South 
Dakota sales tax?19
Did South Dakota Made a  
Strategic Error?
General Trading presented the market states with a 
blueprint for avoiding the constitutional issue of 
when a remote vendor can be made to collect their 
sales taxes—and that was to require the collection of 
their use taxes. To be sure, Dilworth did not hold that 
the Tennessee vendor could not be made to collect 
the Arkansas sales tax provided there was an Arkansas 
sale; it involved only the imposition of a sales tax on a 
transaction that did not constitute a sale in the putative 
taxing state. It could be viewed as having no relevance to 
determining the constitutionality of a statute requiring 
a vendor to collect a sales tax rather than a use tax. But 
if Dilworth controls on what constitutes a sale under 
the Constitution, it is hard to imagine how a remote 
vendor like the gallery is making a sale in the market 
state like South Dakota.
Why should South Dakota invite any challenge at all 
to whether a sale exists in the State when the Court has 
already blessed the collection of the use tax in General 
Trading? That case sent a clear unambiguous message, 
which the states clearly understood because their statutes 
like those in Bellas Hess and Quill refer to the collection 
of a use tax and not a sales tax. I have no idea why South 
Dakota drafted its statute in terms of collecting the sales 
tax rather than following the tried and true—and safe—
pattern of collecting its use tax. Perhaps there are unique 
South Dakota reasons for doing so. But South Dakota 
cannot serve as a model that should be mimicked on this 
point.20 Even if the distinction between a use tax and a 
sales tax can be described as a “triumph of formalism 
over substance,”21 under Dilworth the transaction at the 
New York gallery is not a South Dakota sale. Drafting a 
statute in terms of collecting the sales tax rather than the 
use tax is an invitation to litigation, leaving low-hanging 
fruit in limbo.
Perhaps South Dakota would win such litigation,22 but 
why bother when the legislative fix is so easy. Redrafting 
the statute to impose an obligation to collect the use tax 
would bring this situation safely under General Trading, 
Bellas Hess, and Quill and foreclose litigation (at least on 
this point).
ENDNOTES
* This article is dedicated to John Healy who 
is stepping down as Editor of the Journal. He 
is one of the icons of his generation, whose 
accomplishments are treasured by those of us 
in the field. He gave so much to all of us and 
asked so little in return.
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21 See supra note 17.
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